This Spring America’s target is not Iran but Pakistan

By Abid Mustafa

On February 27 2007, US Vice President Dick Cheney paid a surprised visit to
Pakistan and held private talks with General Musharraf. After the meeting,
Cheney refused to comment on the nature of his visit and left for
Afghanistan. The New York Times stated that Cheney was sent to remind
Musharraf that he must take stiffer action against the Taleban; otherwise US
aid will be in jeopardy. The Pakistani government issued the following
statement: “Cheney expressed US apprehensions of regrouping of Al Qaeda in
the tribal areas and called for concerted efforts in countering the threat”,
  and also talked of “serious US concerns on the intelligence being picked
up of an impending Taliban ‘spring offensive’ against allied forces in
Afghanistan.”  Cheney’s trip coincided with Britain’s Foreign Secretary,
Margaret Becket’s visit to Pakistan. Becket also pressed the Pakistani
government to take more action against Al Qaeda and the Taleban, but struck
more reconciliatory tone. Speaking at the Foreign Services Academy on a
lecture entitled ‘The UK and Pakistan: partners in diplomacy’, she stated
that the UK would not link its aid to Pakistan over its performance on
counter-terrorism measures. So what was the purpose of Cheney’s visit to
Pakistan? Does the British stance suggest cracks in the Anglo-American
alliance over Afghanistan?

Cheney’s visit comes nearly two weeks after Bush gave his speech on
Afghanistan at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he set out US
goals to stabilise Afghanistan and warned about the Taleban spring
offensive. Bush said,” The snow is going to melt in the Hindu Kush
Mountains, and when it does we can expect fierce fighting to continue. The
Taliban and al Qaeda are preparing to launch new attacks…This spring there
is going to be a new offensive in Afghanistan, and it’s going to be a NATO
offensive.” Other US officials most notably US Secretary of Defence, Robert
Gates and US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher have also visited
Pakistan in the past month. Gates’s visit focussed on how to secure greater
freedom for US and NATO forces to launch strikes against Taleban sanctuaries
and conduct military forays deep inside the Pakistani tribal areas, whilst
Boucher reviewed Musharraf’s progress on the peace deals signed with tribal
elders.

The visits by senior officials of the Bush administration to Pakistan
demonstrate that the carrot and stick policy adopted against the Pushtun
resistance and their supporters, since 2003 has started to unravel. The
carrot disguised as Afghan national reconciliation drive was meant to entice
moderate elements of the Taleban, Al-Qaeda, Afghan Mujihideen and ordinary
Pushtoons radicalised by the war—together they constitute the Pushtun
resistance—into a political process to bolster Karzai’s fledging government.
The US is still encouraging Karzai’s government to explore ways of
accommodating moderate elements of the resistance. On January 27 2007,
Karzai renewed the offer of peace talks. He said, “While we are fighting for
our honour, we still open the door for talks and negotiations with our enemy
who is after our annihilation and is shedding our blood.” Karzai’s gestures
of peace comes amid
the passing of a bill on National Stability And Reconciliation by both the
Meshrano Jirga (Council of Elders) and the Wolesi Jirga (People’s Council).
The bill offers blanket amnesty to all parties, and after demonstrations in
Kabul demanding its implementation, awaits Karzai’s signature. Nevertheless,
the US has ruled out the inclusion of hardened Taliban fighters such as Daud
Ullah.

To curb the tribal support enjoyed by the Pushtun resistance, peace-pacts
were introduced by the Musharraf government. These were designed to achieve
two objectives. Firstly to entice tribal elders in laying down their arms,
dismantling the jihadi infrastructure and surrendering elements of the
Pushtun resistance hostile to America in exchange for economic aid.
Secondly, to use the lull in fighting to assemble a moderate faction of the
Taleban, take helm of the Pushtun resistance and invest it in a political
process.  The stick comprised of punitive measures to isolate and destroy
hardcore Pushtun resistance leaders vehemently opposed to the NATO’s
occupation of Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s collaboration with the US.

The peace deals struck by Pakistan had tacit approval from the Bush
administration.
However, the callous killing of civilians by NATO forces and Pakistani
troops on both sides of the border combined with the endemic corruption and
injustices of the Karzai government, have transformed the parochial Pushtoon
resistance into a mass movement.  When the European Union (EU) took command
of NATO they were shocked by the ferocity of the resistance and laboured
hard to contain its growing influence in the Southern Afghanistan. The
rising NATO causalities spurred the EU, especially Britain to expose Taliban
sanctuaries in Pakistan. This forced the Bush administration to gradually
withdraw its support for the peace deals. By now Pakistan was also
struggling to gain control of the Pushtoon resistance. British influence in
the religious seminaries, amongst the scholars and in the tribal areas,
foiled Pakistan’s attempt to create a monolithic Taleban army that Pakistan
could use effectively. Beyond Quetta and some parts of tribal areas the new
Taliban failed to make impact.

It is not the first time the EU has been at odds with the US over
Afghanistan. European countries have consistently refused to deploy a
significant numbers of troops assist NATO efforts in Afghanistan. In his
speech at the AEI, President Bush lamented at European countries for their
failings. He said, “For NATO to succeed, member nations must provide
commanders on the ground with the troops and the equipment they need to do
their jobs…As well, allies must lift restrictions on the forces they do
provide so NATO commanders have the flexibility they need to defeat the
enemy wherever the enemy may make a stand.” The EU’s reluctance to
contribute to NATO’s mission in war torn Afghanistan can only be explained
by its desire to see America fail in Afghanistan. But at the same time the
EU does not want to see Islam returning to Afghanistan—a political conundrum
it has been unable to solve.

The additional US and UK soldiers sent to be bolster NATO troops in
Afghanistan fall way short of the numbers required to confront the Pushtoon
resistance. The troop numbers have been further exacerbated by America’s
distrust of the Afghan army—
the army has been intentionally deprived of heavy weaponry—rendering almost
useless in any upcoming battle. All of this means that the US will have to
bear the brunt of the fighting. This comes as a huge blow— US forces are
over stretched in Iraq and there are not enough troops to send to
Afghanistan. The situation is rapidly deteriorating in Afghanistan. The
assassination attempt on Dick Cheney clearly highlights America’s
predicament.

To redress this situation America has again turned to Musharraf to prepare
for a mini war in the tribal belt and Southern Afghanistan. Negroponte’s
remarks about Al Qaeda regrouping in Pakistan and the recent US intelligence
assessments echoing similar findings are intended to prepare opinion both at
home and abroad for this war. It is expected that Pakistan will provide the
bulk of the troops for this offensive, while NATO will utilise the American
build up in the Gulf to conduct air strikes and limited ground operations.

America knows full well that she will not be able to crush the Pushtun
resistance and that Musharraf may not survive. But the US has no choice—it
is make or break for the US in Afghanistan and the calculus of Musharraf
survival is irrelevant. America’s tactical goal is to degrade the resistance
in Afghanistan and confine it to a small area until next spring. By then the
Bush administration hopes that situation in Iraq would have stabilised and
there would be more US troops to confront the Pushtun resistance in
Afghanistan 2008. But the reality may turn out to be entirely different—
instead of the Pushtun resistance the Caliphate could be waiting for
America.

Abid Mustafa is a political commentator who specialises in Muslim affairs