The Nature and Structure of the Islamic World - Part IV

Ralph Braibanti

7. Differences in Polity

The 52 Islamic nations, thought bonded in the metaphysical realm by common religious belief, are widely separated by differences in state polity. Those differences have been induced or aggravated by colonial rule and by post-colonial enmeshment in a web of new imperialism now cultural and economic. Weak or embryonic political structures cannot easily sustain a polity which is truly indigenous and in harmony with its own cultural and historical circumstances when it is subjected to the transnational commercial and cultural dynamism of the United States, a radiating power of enormous energy and hubris. Nor is robust resistance possible when the web of dependency is upon with threads of gold poised to break unless externally formulated standards of political structure and behavior are met. The greater the integration of Muslim polities with the world at large, the greater the dependence on technologically advanced systems and the greater the threat to distinctive indigenous religious and cultural values. Differing political systems are also the consequences of varying perceptions of the nature on an Islamic state and often of amateurish flirtation with Western political concepts and structures. These include single party and multi-party systems, parliamentary and presidential patterns, unicameral and bicameral legislatures, judicial review, socialism communism, capitalism, and free versus controlled market economies. Even such flirtatious experiments cannot be independent for they are enmeshed in the web of political systems left by colonial rule. That web is too tightly woven to permit escape. The result is a veritable kaleidoscopic display of governmental systems. A few examples of the variations are illustrative.

Pakistan, subjected to the triple trauma of two centuries of British rule, separation from India, and the secession of East Pakistan (to become Bangladesh) is an extreme case. It had four constitutions, thus rearranging the crucial relationship of space, power and culture four times. It had two periods of martial law and massive infusion of American technical assistance. Two heroic efforts were made to escape the web of dependence on the West. The first was the decade (1958-1969) old experiment in Basic Democracies initiated during the regime of Ayub Khan. The second was the ten-year (1977-1987) political structure, Nizam-I-Mustafa (Way of the Prophet) evolved in the regime of Zia ul-Haq. Both were courageous and brilliant efforts to throw off colonial and post -colonial intervention and establish and indigenous polity. The Basic Democracies scheme attracted favorable worldwide attention and had it continued longer it might well have been a model for other developing countries. The fall of the government of Ayub Khan and his replacement first by Yayha Khan then by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the distraction of the secession of East Pakistan brought about the demise of this notable experiment. Nizam-I-Mustafa was a different scheme which sought to evolve an Islamic polity through serious efforts to revise the legal system I accordance with Shari’ a. While this was popular with such groups as the Jammat-I-Islami, it was resisted by others of a more secular persuasion. In any even Nizam-I-Mustafa collapsed with the death of Zia ul-Haq in a mysterious airplane crash in 1988 in which the Unite States ambassador Arnold Raphael, was also killed. The successor governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and no interest in the creation of the their predecessor. The faltering remnant of the parliamentary system introduced under British colonial rule has proved incapable of coping effectively wit the horrendous problems of refugees and bitter regional feuds.

Saudi Arabia is at the other end of the spectrum of comparison. Its religious, linguistic and ethnic cohesion is unmatched. It did not experience colonial rule, hence did not suffer from a disarticulation created by the forced imposition of foreign norms and institutions. In the context of comfortable wealth it constructed its own polity with the Qur’an and as its constitution. It did not have to struggle to reconcile British or French law with Islamic law. It functioned under Islamic law (shari’a), selectively integrating extraneous elements to meet new needs. It built institutions before it expanded political participation and then gradually evolved an appointed representative system (majlis al-Shura) in 1993. The Saudi polity cannot be fitted into Western categories. Neither an absolute monarchy nor a constitutional monarchy of British pattern, it is as nearly indigenous as can be found.

Iran’s polity has a similar indigenous quality, achieved by a different course. The first difference is its history of imperial greatness dating back to Cyrus and Darius in the 6th century BC. There followed waves of Greek, Parthian, Roman and Arab conquest. By 650 AD the Sassanid Empire fell to the Arabs and indigenous Zoroastrianism was replaced by Islam. A long period of Muslim dynasties evolved into constitutional government in the early 20 the century. There then followed a period of monarchical rule under Reza Shah and his successor, Pahlavi Shah. Throughout much of this history the idea of monarchy and intense feelings of devotion to Shia Islam were dominant. In the twentieth century, until 1979, the cultural influence of the West, especially France, Britain and the United States were important. The Khomeini revolution was a drastic effort to establish an indigenous polity. It almost totally detached that polity from the ideological premises and economic and political structures of the international state system of the West. By emphasizing its predominantly non-Arab ethnicity and its Shiite Islam, it has distanced itself somewhat from the ideology and transactions of the Islamic ummah. Its development in the twentieth century ahs been marked also by its relative wealth rather than abject poverty. Like Saudi Arabia, Iran has thus developed an Islamic system of government. Unlike the futile efforts in Pakistan, it has done so by disengaging from along, rich and complicated past of foreign influence. But its tactic was revolution rather than gradualism and thus far it ahs successfully forged a relatively indigenous political system.

The Indonesian case is characterized by the penetrating influence of Hinduism. Western constitutional government, learned from Dutch colonial rule, did not penetrate as deeply as British tutelage in India. There was no imperial pat as in Iran, or an indigenous Islamicity as in Saudi Arabia. Islam was dominant since the 14th century, but was not exclusive; Hinduism still prevailed in many parts. The post-colonial period, starting with 1948 under Sukarno and continued under Soharto, has been dominated by a unique brand of secularism tinged with Islam. The ideology of Pancasila is the national civil religion and is part of the 1945 constitution under which Indonesia is ruled. The five principles of Pancasila, nationalism, humanity (internationalism), consultation (democracy), social justice, and belief in a Supreme Beijing, effectively separate the secular and the sacerdotal, and equation difficult for Muslims to accept. By making adjustments in the applicability of Islam in family law, the pluralistic, secular structure ahs endured and Islam, while not enjoying cultural exclusivity, continues to exist as the religion of 90 percent of the population.

Other mutations in forms of government in Muslim states, while not as striking as the examples give n above, are equally revealing. Morocco and Jordan have variation s of constitutional monarchy. Libya’s Muammar al-Qadafi has invented and “Islamic Arabic Socialist mass-State”. Syria and Iraq live in the somewhat distorted shadows of discarded monarchy created by the British and the indigenous socialist ideology of Michel Alfaq. The Baathist legacy of Aflaq has taken a different turning each but a brutal dictatorship of a Sunni minority (Iraq) and a Shia/Alawite minority (Syria) characterizes both. Malaysia, with a slight majority Muslim population and a long history of British rule, has evolved its own form of government based on a blend of kinship and parliamentary government. Each state has its own sultan. The sultans become head (Yand di-Pertuan Agong) of Malaysia for fixed terms in order of seniority. There is a strong party system and elections to parliament. Under the prime masterships of Dr Mhathsir, the Islamic nature of society is given prominence, but under different, less intensely Muslim leadership, Islam would have a dominant role.

In the struggle to relate Islam to a polity Muslim states must cope with pre-Islamic indigenous heritage, experience of colonial rule, international influences of the economy and culture, indigenous Islamic forces and relations with the Muslim ummah. There is no common agreement among then as to what constitutes an Islamic state.

8.Religoiuos Complementarities

The relationship of three monotheistic Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is not necessarily one of mutual antagonism. Certainly the theological connections are evident and have been analyzed in an enormous volume of literature. Earlier parts of this essay described Islam’s special consideration of ahl al-kitab, people of the book: Jews and Christians. All three religions share a common respect, even reverence, for Old Testament prophets. The naming of Muslims for the Prophets should not go unnoticed, though it maybe obscured by Arabization. Moses becomes Musa; Abraham: Ibrahim; Solomon: Sulyman; Mary: Maryam; David: Daoud; Jesus: Issa; John: Yayha; Joseph: Yusif, to name but a few. The complementarities with Christianity include belief in the virgin birth of Christ, though not in the resurrection, crucifixion, ascension nor in the Trinity of divinity of Christ. Muslims are attentive to if no celebratory of Christmas. Prince Bandar, the current Saudi ambassador to the United States, sends Christmas cards in Arabic with an English translation of part of Sura (chapter) 3 of the Qur’an called Al-Iran sura, which describes the angel’s announcement to Mary of the coming virgin birth of Christ. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate both the adherence to this belief and to the sanctified literalism of the Qur’an is to relate the experience of the American Unitarian clergyman, Moncure D. Conway. In 1905 Conway met in Calcutta with a group of “Brahmans, Brahmos, Moslems and Parsis” to discuss religious and philosophical subjects. One of the Brahman asked his opinion about the “miraculous birth of Christ.” Conway responded that he regarded it like the legend of the virgin-born deity of the Hooghly River, “.... a story of mythological and poetic interest but not to be regarded as historical.” The Brahman said that was also his opinion of both events. Conway then continues to relate this revealing exchange: “The Moslems, of whom there were a dozen of high rank in the room, had said nothing and I remarked that I would like to hear their opinion. Thereupon the Moslems bent their richly turbaned heads together in private consultation. At length one of them arose and said that they all felt ‘bound to accept the narrative just as it stands in the New Testament.” Conway concluded that t= “the Moslems were the only orthodox Christians present”. Elsewhere in his study of religions Conway had found the same views. In Colombo he had concluded that the “Moslems are not Christians, but the only ones in the East who maintain literally all of the miracles ascribed to Christ in the gospels or related to his birth. It is very rare to find among them a sceptic.”

This view of the Qur’an and hence the historicity of Christ’s birth is as prevalent today as it was in Conway’s time. This can be illustrated by an event in England in 1993. A British television series, Spitting Image, featured a rubber puppet of Jesus styled as a hippie. The Ahmadiyya Muslim association protested, pointing out that Muslims revered Jesus and that those responsible for the television series should be severely punished. The puppet was withdrawn. The producer said that he had discussed the puppet with Church of England leaders who regarded it as “innocuous.” The Muslim’ committee said that the Anglican clergy “should be heartened by the leadership provided by British Muslims in protesting [Christian} blasphemy.”

The only predominantly Muslim country in Europe is the newly independent, tragically beleaguered nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The brutal massacre of Muslim Bosnians by Orthodox Christian Serbs serves as a chilling backdrop for the projection of Muslim-Christian relations. Yet the Muslim Bosnian President, Alija Ali Izetbegovic, wrote prophetically that kinship between Islam and Christianity ahs been overlooked. “Their kinship, if we draw all the necessary conclusions from it, could direct the relations of these tow great world religions to an entirely new dimension in the future. ...As Islam in the past was the intermediary between the ancient cultures and the West, it must again today, in a time of dramatic dilemmas and alternatives, shoulder its role as intermediary nation in a divided world. This is the meaning of the third way, the Islamic way.”

The importance of the kinship is reflected in the establishment of new academic structures. Among them is the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at Selly Oak College in Birmingham, England. The Centre publishes Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations semi-annually. In the Unites States, Georgetown University established the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding in 1993.

Relations between Jews and Muslims have not always been hostile. There were times in Islamic history, especially during Muslim ascendancy in Spain (711-1212 AD) when Jews were well treated and often sought Muslim sanctuary from Christian persecution. The Jewish historian, Mark Cohen, asserts that Jews fared better in the Muslim world and challenges the “counter myth of Islamic persecution” that ahs prevailed since the Six-Day War of 1967. The sentiment of Muslim states towards Jews is a political statement about Zionism, the establishment of Israel, the displacement of Palestinians, control of Jerusalem and the third holiest site in Islam: Al Quds al-Haram (the Dome of the Rock). Inevitably this political sentiment, brewing for half a century, translates into attitudes towards Jews as people. But historically this has not been the root cause. It is conceivable that with the achievement of a just Middle East peace settlement, Jewish-Muslim relations will improve and that the constantly invoked them of “Judaeo-Christian” tradition will be expanded to “Judaeo-Christian-Islamic”.

The values and ethical systems of these three Abrahamic monotheisms are quintessentially compatible despite some theological differences and varying interpretations of scripture and history. In the face of what appears to be the disintegration of Western civilization, comparable, the apocalyptics tell us, to the fall of Rome, a unified front of all otherworldly perspectives is needed. The start has been made in Jewish-Christian and Christian-Muslim relations. Now the urgent need is for a similar Jewish-Muslim reconciliation.

Conspectus

The one billion people who profess Islam are not concentrated in a single, unbroken landmass. This differs from the one billion Chinese or the near-billion concentration of population on the subcontinent of India. Any imagery of a great green horde, controlled by a single government, capable of raising enormous land armies, is fallacious. The major divisions of the world’s Muslim population can roughly be divided in this way: 220 million Arabs live in 22 Arab states (members of the League of Arab States) (dar al-Islam); 450 million Muslims live in some 33 non-Arab but Muslim states (members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (dar al-Islam); 330 million live as minorities in every non-Muslim nation in the world (dar al-harb); 20 million (a rapidly fluctuating number) refugees are scattered in a global Diaspora often displaced with their homelands (dar al-muhajirin).

The overwhelming majority of Muslim live in abject poverty. The 1994 per capita gross domestic Product (GDP pc in US dollars) of the counties in which they live range from the lowest-Mozambique (115), Sudan (184), Chad (190), Afghanistan (200), Bangladesh (200) to the highest-Qatar (17,000), United Arab Emirates (13,800). Kuwait (11,000), Brunei (8,800), Bahrain (7,800), Saudi Arabia (6,500). Nor do minorities necessarily live in countries of better economic circumstances. India, which ahs the world’s largest Muslim minority, has a GDPpc of 270; china’s is 360. Minorities in western industrialized countries are better off, a fact which partly accounts for Muslim migration to those countries. The outstanding examples are the Algerian influx to France. The GDPpc figures have meaning when compared to those of such industrialized western countries as France (18,900), Germany (17,400), United Kingdom (15,900), and Canada (919,600).

The poverty of Muslim nations is aggravated by high rates of natural population increase. Iraq, Libya and Syria have a natural increase of 3.7 percent-the highest rates in the world. They are closely followed by Niger, Pakistan, Libya, Jordan and Iran with rates from 3.0 to 3.7 percent. Morocco and Algeria, whose population increases are a source of concern to France, rank next with percentages of 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. These figures are alarming when compared wit those for other non-industrial states such as India (1.6 percent) and China (1.1) and with industrial states such as Japan (0.3), Italy (0.1), France (0.4), United Kingdom (0.3) and the Untied States (0.7). The global Muslim population is expanding much more rapidly than non-Muslims. This is likely to increase religious and ethnic tensions and to enhance the prospect of Islamic-non-Islamic confrontation. This is all the more reason for strenuous efforts towards mutual understanding and accommodation.

Muslims live in a kaleidoscopic array of political systems ranging from the secular republican polity of Turkey to the Islamic constitutional systems of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The character of the ummah is essentially spiritual; it owes no allegiance to nation-states; it transcends them. Yet in the real world the nation-state is the dominant political authority and the ummah is realized mainly in rhetoric and in a slowly emerging pattern of pan-Islamic structures while will probably grow in importance. Islamic unity is weakened by significant divisions, especially by those created by the hegemonic impulse of a secular-leaning Iraq and similar impulses of an Islamic -oriented Iran. The violent acts committee d by a variety of groups form different nations, some claiming an Islamic identity, and others having that identity conferred on them by the West, have been consistently condemned by Muslim states and Muslim international organizations. There are sporadic upsurges of Islamic militancy but they should not be regarded as a globally planned movement embracing the whole Muslim world.

The dangers which the apocalyptic forecasters tell of the “Green Menace” are not, then, dangers of a global uprising against the Wet. The threat lies in the possible control of Egypt, Algeria, the Sudan and Saudi Arabia by militant Muslim absolutists who, linked with Iran and Iraq, may not hesitate to use violence. Their fist line of attack would be seizure of internal power.

The dilemma lies in dissatisfaction of populations with regimes, which are perceived as corrupt and even un-Islamic. When groups such as the national Salvation Front of Algeria are denied their share of duly elected power by invalidation of the election by a military regime, this may generate violence. The invalidation is supported by foreign powers, the discontent becomes internationalized and external violence is perceived as justified protections against foreign intervention.

The proper role for the West is not to interfere in the play of internal political forces in a sovereign state. Mature, western political systems can deal with regimes even though power is held by agents deemed antagonistic. When such regimes act externally by aggression (as in the case of Iraq) or by proven complicity in international acts of violence, the intervention may be justified.

The Confucian-Islamic connection described by Huntington is not out of the question. But is presupposed a Pakistan allied with the Islamic absolutists and a China and North Korea actively embarked on international mischief. It also presupposes a western world blind to Muslim fears and aspirations. Western failure to act in Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, and reluctance initially to act in Afghanistan, and its distorted inequitable participation in the Palestinian question, lend credibility to this assumption. That presupposition could be corrected; all these conditions are reversible.

The problem faced internally by the Muslim world appear to be overwhelming. Muslims perceive their values to be increasingly dissonant from those of western liberalism, which seems to have lost its moorings in piety, morality and ethics. Islamic polities must be perceived as part of a total epistemology, hence must be judged by their own internally generated criteria. Yet the criteria are subjected to internal conflict as to their meaning and their relationship to the on-Muslim world.

Every great issue of human existence: liberty, justice, welfare, security, dignity, respect, enlightenment, rectitude, death, affection, divine will and divine message ahs it sown scriptural inspiration and internal consistency. It is especially difficult for the West to understand the tacit, indwelling nature of the Muslim psyche. There is no agreed-upon technique for analyzing the salience of the non-verbal, intuitive dimension of man’s being: a dimension, which forms an important part of Muslim identity. Only when Spengler’s metaphor of the “world cavern” and his use of the term “soul” are understood can the perennial dialectic of the ummah and the modern nation-state have meaning.

Perhaps the greatest challenge is the alternately harmonious and abrasive confrontation of the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds. The Muslim value system is an all-embracing, all-encompassing moral aesthetic continuum. Yet it is not iconoclastic or exclusive. On the contrary, its dominion is universal and it is undeterred as to time, space or race. The coherence and integrity of its own belief system just be self-maintaining and yet be sued as a radiating source for its universalization. This must be achieved within the context of a world order predominantly non-Islamic and which places the Muslim world in a position of dependency. Such subordination is acerbated by the juggernaut of non-Muslim cultural and commercial imperialism propelled by a dynamic of communications technology and entrepreneurial hubris.

The Muslim world must preserve its values, reconcile conflicting values, yet achieve that reconciliation without overt hostile confrontation with non-believers. Important strides have been taken at the ideological level with Christianity; the next step should be with Judaism. The internal mechanism for achieving all reconciliation is well ensconced in Islamic doctrine: ijtihad. The problem is that of dislodging the mechanism from two threatening webs. The first is the violent minority element in Islamic society whose actions may justify the use of the term “rage” characterizing the work of Lewis, Wright, Worsethorne and others. The second is extricating the interpretations from the encrustations and iconoclasms of village exegesis (the mullah mentality) so that it can function in an enlightened way without betraying Qur’anic truths. Regrettably, these two threats are often united in the same person or group.

There is a significant movement, scattered geographically to reinterpret Islam to fit the present age. This is consistent with ijtihad. Those bent on such reform are in Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Algeria and Iran. They are typically professional people educated in the West. They do not repudiate Islam. On the contrary, they are devout observing Muslims in the tradition of Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher of India whose Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1934) remains classic. These reforms are opposed by traditionalist clerics and by radical militants, neither of whom favor the western style democracy which the reformers advocate.

A different reform effort is that labeled “Islamic literalist” which seeks to replace pro-western Islamic regimes with anti-Western Islamic ideologies. These movements are attractive to young Muslims and may, in some analysts’ view be the beginning rather than the end of “the militant Islamic movement”.

Although the non-Islamic world manifests an ecumenical interest in Islam as a religion, it is often based on issues of global political power and national security rather than on respect and esteem. There is some evidence, as this essay has pointed out, of a concurrent movement towards a true ideological comprehension arising from a base of religious complementarity and agreement on social issues.

Only a courageous assertion of the Muslim value system proclaimed by an authoritative global political structure can command the respect and esteem of that part of the world which repudiates Muslim values even while holding hands across the creeds. The present kaleidoscopic array of those institutional segments in the Muslim world must be reassembled in a cohesive paradigm and structure which gives meaning and influence to the concept of ummah. This paradigm and structure must be capable both of capturing the imagination of the Muslim psyche and uniting the ummah spiritually if not politically. This condition appears to be slowly emerging. The evolution of intra-Islamic attention to minorities and refugees, more forceful assertion of Muslim values and political power and conciliatory gestures toward other faiths: these are glimmers of hope. Only the resolution of these issues will restore the world of Islam to the distinctive position of global influence commensurate with its territorial domain and its demographic strength.

In reasserting the paramountancy of its culture it must continue to disclaim all forms of violence. This ahs already been done by the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and by individual states. It must also reject the specious unilinear concept of “westernization”. The Islamic world is an example of the circularity of culture change and of the permeability of civilizational boundaries. It has, after all, been one of the foremost sources for the radiation and reception of values, and the transmission and translation of values form one culture to another, in the history of the world. Probably no other civilization, neither Greek, Roman or Persian, has had global experience in all five processes radiation, receptivity, transmission, translation and preservation of culture change. Anyone fully cognizant of this aspect of Islamic development would immediately comprehend the views of Spengler, Toynbee, Northrop, Berdyaev, and Malinowski.

It is a cruel irony that at the moment when Islam is free of colonial domination and some of its segments are endowed with a degree of wealth, it is plagued and fragmented by intra-Islamic conflict, sporadic violence by minority groups and dependence upon the technetronic largesse of the non-Muslim world. A true recovery o f Islamic identity cannot be achieved in the context of these three obstacles. Lebanon and the Palestinian problem must be stabilized and enmities between Muslim states must be sedated. Violent acts attributed to Muslim impulse must be seen as small percentages of such acts committed worldwide: 21 percent of the incidents and 31% of organizations with middle East/Islam connections for the five-year period 1990-94. Muslim foreign policy must be coordinated, reconciliation or at least an understanding between Muslim an understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim values must be achieved. The global Muslim political structures now in existence (such as LAS, OIC, GCC) must be strengthened.

The most optimistic hope for the Muslim world lies in the differentials in piety and dynamism which now exist between Islam and the non-Muslim world. The Muslim value system appears to be more pristine, more intact than the doctrines of Christianity which are increasingly being relegated to the realm of myth of fanaticism. In consequence, zeal and intensity of piety may be diminishing. Islam, on the other hand, is in a dynamic, effervescent stage of development. We cannot predict how long these conditions may last or whether they may be reversed, i.e. Islam in decline and non-Islam in the ascendancy. But at this moment in history the dynamics and clearly defined values of Islam have the potential for resuscitating the western world’ decline to morbidity. This can be done only if the image projected by Islam on the global screen and the actions of Muslims on the world state are compatible with Islamic principles of peace, justice, and reverence for life. 

Appendices
About the Author

Afterword by Javeed Akhter, M.D., Executive Director
International Strategy and Policy Institute

The International Strategy and Policy Institute (ISPI) was established in 1994 by a group of American Muslims in the Chicago area. Its objective is to promote correct understanding about Islam in the United States and to explain the moral and ethical positions of Islam. It seeks to bring those positions to bear on the formulation of public policy. The institute is motivated by the belief that great nations like the United States should not just have interests but ideals. Islamic ideals promote justice and advocate a middle of the road approach and would be a positive influence on the United States and the world.

One of the means of achieving these ideals is the publication of position papers on selected topics of public policy in which Islamic solutions might play a constructive role. This essay by Professor Ralph Braibanti is the first of this series. A condensed version was delivered as a lecture at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Chicago, march 31, 1995. The essay is necessarily broad in scope as it seeks to establish the contextual framework for the subsequent papers. These will deal with the specific issues such as justice, environment, family values, personal health, spiritual life and relations between Islam and other religions particularly Judaism and Christianity. One basic objective of the Institute’s efforts is to promote understanding and harmony among all the religious beliefs. Therefore the emphasis is on similarities of religious views and practices rather than on differences.

Muslims are approximately 27 percent of the world population, have a rich civilization and a distinctive perspective on life. They are a significant and growing minority in Europe and North America, yet they are not properly understood. Ignorance about Islam results in widespread stereotyping of Muslims frequently leading to racial and ethnic distortions. This first position paper is designed in part to stratify these misconceptions and offers methodologies for correcting them. Professor Braibanti’s explanation of the origins of antagonism towards Islam and the distortions implicit in the term “fundamentalist” is a necessary first step in promoting an understanding of Islam in the West. Regrettably, distortions of Islam are not limited to popular culture but equally permeate scholarly literature as the work of Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington suggest. Even a cursory view of the Muslim world and Muslim history belies the notion that Muslims are violent extremists. From the Spanish Inquisition of 1492 to the current “ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian Muslims by Serbs, the massacres of Chechnya by the Russians, or the atrocities against Kashmiri Muslims by Indian security forces, Muslims have and continue to be victims rather than perpetrators of violence.

Knowledge of fundamental Islamic principles and moral values would clarify many misunderstandings. These moral values drive decisions that many Muslims make as individuals and are the ideals that guide policy in Muslim nations. These beliefs would be catalysts for equity and socio-economic justice and may stem moral decay in American society. In an abbreviated form, these are the quintessential of the Muslims belief system.

Muslims believe in one transcendental God, Allah. The belief in one God is called Taw’hid. The Arabic word Allah is grammatically unique, as it has no derivatives. It is neither plural nor gender specific; thus it emphasizes that the one and only God is neither male nor female. God’s omnipotence and omnipresence transcend space, time, and gender.

While acknowledging the prophets of the Old Testament and the prophethood but not the divinity of Issa (Jesus), Muslims believe that Muhammad, (peace be upon him - PBUH) was the final prophet of God. Muslims believe in the eternal message of their scripture, the Qur’an, and in the historical and theological relationship with other related scriptures especially the Old Testament and the Bible. The Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and remains the same today fourteen centuries later.

Muslims believe in individual responsibility and accountability. All humans start with a clean record and with the freedom and capacity to choose between right, halal, and wrong, haram. They are answerable for their own deeds without any intermediary between them and God. Through the Qur’an mankind is the recipient of divine wisdom and knowledge. Knowledge is glorified in Islam. The first word revealed to the Prophet was Read, Iqra. The acquiring, expanding and spreading of knowledge is considered a sacred duty.

Like many other faiths, Islam believes in devotion to one’s parents, goodwill, kindness, forgiveness towards others and self-restraint. However, the practice of self-restraint is not to be stretched to the extent of practicing monastic life. It is recommended that individuals get married and that they participate fully in both the joys and tribulations of life on earth. The institution of marriage is at the core of family life of Muslims. A Muslim marriage is a contract rather than a sacrament. Civility between spouses is mandated by the Qur’an and reinforced by the Prophet’s own life. In case of marital discord arbitration and counseling is highly recommended. Divorce is permitted only as a last resort.

The same principles that govern private conduct between individuals also govern societies. The use of alcohol and drugs are forbidden as they are both personal addictions and are harmful to the society. Gambling enterprises including State lotteries are practically nonexistent.

Justice is another value that Islam emphasizes at the core of a healthy and peaceful society. Islam’s messenger, Muhammad (PBUH), exhorted his followers to stop injustice actively or at the very least not to rationalize it. In extreme cases of injustice, Muslims believe in the right of self-defense. To struggle against an unjust cause or personal temptation is referred to as a Jihad. Jihad, unlike the Crusades, is not equivalent of Holy War. Jihad in the deepest sense is the eternal struggle in human life between good and evil forces.

Principles of justice and equality also govern gender and race relationships. Men and women are considered equal in the eyes of Allah. Religious responsibilities are largely the same for men and women; each must pray, fast, give alms and go on pilgrimage to Mecca. While men and women are seen as complementary roles, modesty of clothing and behavior is encouraged for both men and women. The intent is to create an environment in which the spiritual rather than the sensual qualities of men and women are given prominence. Over time, this idea has been corrupted by various cultural forces and has been made to appear as religious sanctions for discrimination against women. The concept of equality applies to all classes and races. A dramatic example of this is seen during the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca called Hajj where all Muslims, rich and poor, black and white, wear the same clothing as a sign of universal brotherhood. This concept of racial equality is one of the most deeply rooted principles of Islam.

This egalitarianism and emphasis on human dignity carry on into the notion of self-respect and freedom from blasphemy and false accusations. In Muslim law the penalty for bringing a false accusation is a severe as the alleged crime. Human rights are an original Islamic concept. European crusaders learned principles of humane treatment of prisoners of war from their contact with Islamic jurisprudence.

Muslim jurisprudence is based on rights and principles called the Shar’ia. Individuals have a right to life, dignity, family, knowledge, property and freedom from coercion in matters of religion., Crimes are regarded as violations of divine law not human law. Islamic punishments (Hudud) have received much criticism in the West for being harsh. These punishments are effective because they are tempered by a rigid judicial process and by compassion, forgiveness and general God-consciousness in the society. Even in the case of the death penalty for murder, relatives of the victim are encouraged to forgive and accept fair restitution. Islam believes strongly in the sanctity for human life and does not allow for its destruction including suicide and most cases of abortion.

In Muslim law the right to own property and generate wealth is tempered by an acute sense of fair dealing, equitable distribution of wealth and socio-economic justice. One of the major tenets of Islam is Zakat, a compulsory sharing of wealth with needy members of the society. A productive economy free of exploitation is required and encouraged.

Concerning public polity Islam stipulates only the guiding principles of “government by the righteous” and “governance by consultation.” No specific governmental structure is recommended. The result is a wide spectrum of political systems. As Islam is a holistic belief system there is no separation between church and state.

The prevailing perceptions of Islam in the West are so unfair and divorced from reality that Muslims understandably feel frustrated. The result is cynicism, anger, and a tendency for Muslims to isolate themselves. If the media gave more attention to educating themselves and the public about the fundamentals of Islam through presentations like Dr. Braibanti’s paper rather than chasing such phantoms as “fundamentalism,” “green menace” and “Muslim rage,” we could begin to reverse some of these erroneous perceptions. Many western paradigms do not apply to Muslim societies. “Fundamentalism” and “holy war” are both western paradigms with no equivalence in Islam. Extremism in many Muslim countries should be understood for what it is, namely a reaction to repressive dictatorial regimes. An unbiased and balanced study of Muslims would be the morally correct and intellectually honest stance that would further bond Muslims and the countries that they have chosen to live in. Thus, the richness and rectitude of the Muslim value system would contribute positively to the maintenance of a just and harmonious social order. As Dr. Braibanti points out, “...at this moment in history the dynamics and clearly defined values of Islam have the potential for resuscitating the western world’s decline. 

ISPI is a non-profit organization established in 1994 by a group of American Muslims in the Chicago area. Its objective is to promote correct understanding about Islam in the United States and to explain the moral and ethical position of Islam.  Information about joining or supporting ISPI. The book, The Nature and Structure of the Islamic World may be purchased on Amazon at http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/096472040X/qid=1141485764/sr=1-3/ref=sr_1_3/002-2648573-1657652?s=books&v=glance&n=283155