The Mecca Agreement: What Should We Expect?

By Ramzy Baroud

The Makkah agreement, signed between rival Palestinian groups, Hamas and
Fatah on February 8, under the auspices of the Saudi leadership, was
welcomed by thousands of cheering Palestinians throughout the occupied
territories, and seen as the closing of a chapter of a bloody and tumultuous
period of their history.

Officially, although more subtly, there is an equal eagerness to bring a
halt to an oppressive command of economic and diplomatic sanctions that have
rendered most Palestinians unemployed and living well below the poverty
line.

In fact, almost all Palestinians want to remember, if they must, the bloody
clashes that claimed the lives of over 90 people since December as a distant
memory, a bitter deviation from a norm of unity and national cohesion,
according to which they want their struggle to be remembered.

Diplomatically, aides to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas of
Fatah, and advisors to Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh are fanning out across
the globe, each group heading to its traditional political milieus: the
former group to Western Europe and the United States, and the latter to
Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. Both Fatah and Hamas are keen to
demonstrate that by endorsing the agreement, their fundamental position
remains unchanged, an arduous task indeed.

The official reactions to the agreement, emanating from the four corners of
the globe are hardly encouraging. The so-called Middle East Quartet—
consisting of the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and
Russia—although they welcomed the agreement, hoping that it might produce
the desired ‘calm’, reiterated their conditions that must be unreservedly
ratified by the Palestinian government if the sanctions are to be lifted;
these conditions are the recognition of Israel, the renouncing of violence
and the acceptance of past agreements signed between both parties, namely
the Oslo Accords.

Though the Quartet is seen to have withheld its final judgment on whether
the formulation of the unity government constitutes an acceptance, either
directly or by implication of its three conditions, Israel is embarking on
its own diplomatic campaign to heighten pressure. Israeli Foreign Minister,
Tzipi Livni, who was recently in Munich to attend a global security
conference, has reportedly met EU’s defence and security coordinator Javier
Solana, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and foreign ministers of Austria,
Sweden and other countries. She has also spoken to US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice twice over the phone, as reported in the Israeli daily
Haaretz. Her phone diplomacy has also reached Germany, Britain and Norway.
Livni’s behaviour is but a mere expression of the attitude that is currently
being developed in Israel; the international community must continue to
pressure Palestinians until the three conditions are satisfied in full from
an Israeli point of view.

The main predicament to the Israeli quest, however, is the same old dilemma:
Palestinians can never, under any circumstances and no matter how great
concessions are; meet Israeli expectations, for these expectations are
crafted in so clever a way that makes is practically impossible for any
Palestinian leader or government to comply. Neither late President Yasser
Arafat, who wore an Israeli flag pin side by side with a Palestinian one on
his Khaki jacket managed to live up to Israel’s seemingly ‘reasonable’
demands, nor did his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, who was ironically elevated
in his political relevance to become the darling of Israel and Washington
when Hamas swept the majority of the vote in the legislative elections of
January 2006, which subsequently led to the devastating sanctions. The
Israeli government labelled Abbas ‘weak’ and ‘indecisive’. He too, by the
same standards, was not able to meet Israel’s conditions, why should we
expect Hamas or any other to do so?

The practical Israeli position—as opposed to rhetorical - is rather clear
and should not involve any exaggerated analysis: let Palestinians continue
to be collectively punished, succumb to internal feuds and dwell in their
limitless misery to allow Israel the needed time to further consolidate its
territorial schemes in the West Bank and occupied Jerusalem: locking up more
Palestinian communities in Bantustan-like localities, while Jewish
settlements continue to be conveniently linked up to so-called “Israel
proper” using the pretext of security and the mammoth and encroaching
imprisonment wall as the means to such and end.

The Makkah agreement’s import stems from whether it will present Israel with
the opportunity to discredit Palestinians’ intentions, thus prolonging the
international sanctions and internal chaos. Interestingly, these two points
are also the core of the Palestinians efforts, who hope that the agreement,
in which Hamas commits to ‘abide’ by past agreements signed by the PLO and
Israel, is sufficient to end the effective state of chaos in the occupied
territories and convince the international community that enough concessions
have been made and that time has arrived for the sanctions to be lifted.

This is likely to be the Israeli and Palestinian quest for the next few
weeks, especially as the final judgment on the Makkah agreement is likely to
be pronounced after two significant meetings: a tripartite summit that would
bring together Rice, Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Monday,
February 19, and two days later, a crucial meeting in Berlin of the
Quartet’s ministers.

Evidently, the US final position is expected to be slightly amended, if not
a carbonic copy of that of Israel; no surprises there since President Bush’s
administration foolishly amalgamated its Middle East policy with Israel’s
self-serving national and regional agenda. But one must not be too hasty as
to make such a determination without consulting the significance of the
place in which the agreement was signed: Saudi Arabia.

There is no doubt that the Saudi position has finally revitalised the role
of Arab states in regional conflicts (the Makkah agreement was signed after
incessant talks between Fatah and Hamas in Egypt and Jordan). London-based
Saudi analyst Mai Yamani suggests that the Makkah agreement is an attempt to
quell Iran’s growing influence in the region. “Iran has been financing
Hamas, while the Saudis in the last few months even refused to meet (Hamas
Prime Minister Ismail) Haniyeh. They realised that if there is more chaos in
the Palestinian territories Iran will have more influence.”

If that assessment is accurate, partly or entirely, and considering the US’
own endeavours to undermine Iran’s strategic outreach in the region, it
might indeed be rational for the US to live with the Makkah agreement and
deal with the ‘moderate’ elements within the Palestinian government, even if
temporarily. Yet again, the US hardly behaves in accordance with its own
interests in the Middle East if such attitudes run counter to Israel’s own
regional designs.

The next a few weeks will reveal the potency of the Makkah agreement, as
opposing interpretations of what it in fact means and how such meaning
should be implemented will determine the next step for all parties involved.
Its failure, however, which remains a dreadful possibility, shall have
detrimental affects on the Palestinian people, any prospect for their
coveted future unity and will further undermine their national agenda for
years to come.

-Ramzy Baroud’s latest book, The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of
a People’s Struggle (Pluto Press), is available at Amazon.com and also from
the University of Michigan Press. He is the editor of
PalestineChronicle.com; his website is ramzybaroud.net