Musharraf’s American Plan

Musharraf’s American Plan

By Abid Mustafa

Over the years, General Musharraf has been given undue credit for plans
which appear to be home-grown solutions to domestic and international
problems that involve Pakistan and the Muslim ummah. But often enough these
schemes turn out to be American initiatives designed to perpetuate US
hegemony over Pakistan and the Muslim world.

The present educational reforms, structural changes to the economy, the
normalisation drive with India, the infamous Kashmir plan and peace-deals
with the tribal agencies—to mention a few— were all conceived in Washington
and Musharraf was simply given the task of executing them. Musharraf’s
latest international endeavour is no different and bears all the hall marks
of a plan made in America.

Musharraf’s visit to five Arab capitals and four Muslim countries cannot be
divorced from America’s overall plan for Iraq and the broader Middle
East—the heart of which is the settlement of the protracted Arab-Israeli
conflict. It was no coincidence that Musharraf’s trip came after the
publication of the Baker-Hamilton report and Bush’s State of the Union
address.

Whilst Musharraf remains guarded about the substance of his visits, the US
State Department is more candid about the content. At a briefing, State
Department spokesman Sean McCormack said, “President Musharraf has made some
recent trips around the globe to Arab Muslim states and some non-Arab Muslim
states to talk about a couple of … issues…One, how they can band together to
address the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and two, also how to,
in some way, address the divide within the Muslim community between the
Sunni and Shia.”

Ostensibly, McCormack’s remarks are a salient endorsement of some aspects of
the Baker-Hamilton report. For instance, recommendation 2 of the report
states: ’Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support,
and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from
non-neighbouring Muslim nations’.  Apart from an odd mention of a forum of
foreign ministers to discuss these issues, neither Musharraf’s government
nor the US State Department were prepared divulge additional information.
McCormack said, “As I understand it now, it’s still taking shape.”

Clearly then for the Bush administration to succeed in Iraq and the broader
Middle East, two things are required: a) legitimacy in the Muslim world for
the recognition of Israel and b) the deployment of Muslim troops to
stabilise Iraq, when the Americans leave.

On the issue of Palestine, Musharraf has a head start. The Makkah accord
reached between Hamas and Fatah implicitly recognises Israel. The
appointment of neutrals to the finance and security posts is intended to
placate international donors and satisfy the conditions imposed by Western
powers on the new unity government. Against this background, Musharraf’s
role is to forge consensus amongst key Muslim countries to give the Islamic
world’s seal of approval to the deal, persuade the Palestinians to halt the
violence against Israel and return to the road map.  The Bush administration
hopes that this will send the right message to both Israel and the Jewish
lobby in the US to terminate their objections to the road map and commence
final status negotiations with the Palestinians.

In Iraq—apart from providing valuable support to the Iraqi government—
Musharraf’s function is to assemble a coalition of Muslim troops to takeover
responsibility from retreating US troops. The Americans believe that the
presence of Muslim troops is less likely to fuel resistance against the US
occupation of Iraq—especially in centre of the country. The Saudis have
already expressed the idea of funding the establishment of Sunni brigades to
offset Shia militias. Musharraf’s visit to Turkey, Indonesia and Egypt is an
attempt to get these countries to commit a sufficient number of troops for
Iraq. But why has the US given Musharraf such a task?

Two reasons come to mind. First, Pakistan’s strategic location and its
extensive ties with the Arabs and the remainder of the Muslim world, places
the Musharraf government in pole position for such a mission. Second, the
political instability generated by hostile Muslim populations towards
American ventures in the Muslim world make it extremely difficult for any
leader to contemplate such a task. However, Musharraf differs from other
leaders. His dedication to preserve American interests and his ability to
manipulate state institutions to mollify public outbursts against American
projects in Pakistan and the wider Muslim world place him head and shoulders
above anyone else.

Nevertheless, there is a huge paradox with Musharraf’s American plan.
Musharraf is relying on rulers— who like him have usurped power and depend
upon US support to remain in power — to bestow legitimacy on behalf of the
Muslim world to endorse US efforts to partition Iraq and create a
Palestinian prison state. This will not be accepted by the Muslim ummah.
Furthermore, it will permanently place the leaders—be they of secular or
Islamic ilk—in the traitors camp and give credibility to those voices who
call for the re-establishment of the Caliphate.


Abid Mustafa is a political commentator who specialises in Muslim affairs


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