Israelis and Palestinians back on the brink

Tony Klug

(Speech given at the Interreligious & International Federation for World Peace in London on July 2, 2006)

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict - once again - is back on the brink. Once again, violence begets violence and outrage begets outrage. And once again it will be seen that there is no military solution to this conflict.

When, eventually, the current turmoil settles down - whatever the fate of the hapless abducted soldier - we will still be left with certain hard truths. Foremost among them are that Palestinians and Israelis are fated to live alongside each other one way or another; that the indefinite continuation of this never-ending conflict is not inevitable - but it is possible; that occupations - like other forms of colonial rule – are, eventually, always resisted and at that point the occupier is faced with the straightforward choice of getting out or clamping down; and that keeping ‘hope’ alive is imperative if the lid is not to close altogether on the prospects for peacemaking.

Trying to make sense of the tortuous manoeuvres on both sides over the last few days, difficult enough, is complicated still further by the parallel internal power struggles taking place between – on the Palestinian side - not just the Hamas-led government and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, but also among different factions and wings of Hamas, inside and outside the occupied territories. Exactly how all of this will play itself out is yet to be seen.

What is clear, though, in the broader picture, is that Hamas’s striking victory in January’s Palestinian parliamentary elections has triggered widespread alarm in Israel and elsewhere. And, it is fair to say, not without cause. The organization has an atrocious record of terrorism against Israeli civilians, an appallingly antisemitic charter and is formally dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish state. It is hardly surprising that Israelis are not jumping with joy. Yet there is a danger – as laid bare by current events - that rash reactions will bring about the very disasters it is hoped to avoid. So it is worth taking stock of the situation, at least as it was prior to the distressing developments of the last few days.

First, opinion polls immediately following the elections showed 84% of Palestinian voters supporting a peace agreement with Israel, including 75% of Hamas voters. Nearly 70% still supported Abbas as president. Thus a strong plurality of Palestinians, while voting for Hamas, did not endorse its underlying ideology. Its electoral good fortune was primarily an outcome of the failure of Fatah to deliver on its promise to negotiate an end to the Israeli occupation and a halt to the desperate decline in Palestinian living conditions.

Secondly, for some 16 months, Hamas had largely observed a unilateral ceasefire and in principle was amenable to a much longer one. While this stance has been severely tested by the latest round of mutual atrocities and belligerency, the movement would have to crack down sooner or later on Islamic Jihad and other violent irregular groups if it was serious about staying on the political track and especially if its standing as the legitimate Palestinian government – whether alone or in coalition with other parties - was to be internationally respected. All told, Hamas’s electoral victory has curtailed its potential freedom of action far more than defeat would have done.

Thirdly, whatever its rhetoric, Hamas’s principal preoccupation is with domestic issues: ensuring its government survives, restoring law and order, meeting basic economic needs and providing salaries for the PA’s roughly 160,000 employees, many of whom have not been paid since mid-March. For all this, it needs space, a prolonged period of calm and international funding.

For its part, Israel’s policy priorities are to carry out its ‘convergence’ or ‘realignment’ policy, involving closing some Jewish settlements in the West Bank while consolidating others and establishing de facto borders behind a completed ‘separation barrier’. It too needs external financial support, especially to relocate tens of thousands of settlers, and some sort of truce. Thus, to advance towards their respective aims, each party requires the tacit compliance of the other.

In some ways, then, there is a convergence between the two sides’ short-to-medium term interests. At present, neither is looking for a comprehensive settlement – they may prefer what Henry Kissinger has called ‘an interim agreement of indefinite duration’ - but there was, and maybe still is, a prospect for pragmatic co-operation over such matters as trade, border crossings, utility services, public health and the environment.

However, the strategy pursued by Israel and the Quartet (US, EU, Russia, UN) – with the connivance of other parties including Fatah - has been to isolate and destabilize the Hamas government and starve it of funds unless and until it fulfils the three conditions of renouncing violence, recognizing Israel and honouring previous accords.

On the face of it, these demands may seem reasonable but by pressing them so swiftly and forcefully - the Quartet dictated them to Hamas just five days after the Palestinian elections - and backing them up with rigorous sanctions, the question is prompted of what was the true aim? If it was to bring about the quick disintegration of the Hamas-led government – which may be an underlying purpose of Israel’s present operation - and if it succeeds, what then? Here are a few possible scenarios:

First, a coup led by Fatah, supported by Israel and the west. However, Fatah is seriously fragmented, in deep crisis and likely to make itself even more unpopular if it acts so blatantly against the democratically expressed will of the Palestinian people. It is hard to see how, at this point, it could successfully run a government.

Secondly, a steady descent of Palestinian society into anarchy, leading either to a form of civil war or a division of the territory among warlords. There are already signs of this happening, with family feuds and gangster wars fuelling internal violence.

Thirdly, a full-scale Israeli re-invasion and the total collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Israel would then have to take direct responsibility for running the whole of the West Bank and possibly Gaza too. Even if this were practically feasible, there is no political will these days within Israel to burden itself with such a fearsome responsibility.

A fourth option is the indefinite provision of financial aid direct to the Palestinian population by the international community. This, in effect, is the current Quartet strategy. Its chief flaw is that the problem is not one of finding channels for humanitarian assistance but rather widespread unemployment and a severe deficiency in the provision of vital basic services, which are mostly government services. These are the underlying causes of the growing poverty. It is not charity that is needed but economic revival and good social and economic management. Bypassing the elected government instead of working with it cannot possibly meet these needs. This is not a workable policy.

All the above options run a serious risk of a total collapse of the economy, leading to a humanitarian catastrophe, political chaos, a resumption of full-scale violence and the further radicalization of the population – not an ideal formula for progress on the peace front. The forced ousting of Hamas - which so far has rejected al-Qaida’s public advances and condemned the bombings at the Egyptian resort of Dahab - may see a more successful penetration of Palestinian society by the global jihadi movement.

There is little doubt that it is strongly in the interests of the principal parties - including Israel, the Palestinians themselves, the western nations and the Arab states - to support the transformation of Hamas from a paramilitary organization to a serious political player, for it will remain a significant force among the Palestinian people whether in or out of government. However, if forced from power, Hamas may abandon the political path altogether, revert to its most extreme demands and resume its violent methods.

So what may be done?

A straightforward option, in the short term, is for the international community, including Israel, to recognize the democratic choice of the Palestinian people and work pragmatically with the Hamas government. Rather than threatening and pushing it into a corner, the movement could be coaxed over time into discarding its more belligerent and unrealistic policies. Hamas is still full of illusions, slowly adapting to the obligations of government and divided about its approach to Israel. The internal political processes within Palestinian society need some breathing space to develop.

We have seen recent evidence of what these internal processes may produce in the form of a document drawn up by prominent Hamas and Fatah detainees in Israeli prisons. Its 18-point programme addresses both the immediate crisis – primarily by calling for a national unity government, on which some progress was apparently being made just as the strike on the Israeli soldiers took place – and the long-term question of peace with Israel. In essence, it calls for a Palestinian state alongside Israel, based on the borders prior to the 1967 war, with East Jerusalem as its capital, the return of refugees and the freeing of prisoners in Israeli jails.

Aside from the refugee problem – which most parties acknowledge has to be solved eventually in a fair, acceptable and comprehensive way even if they fiercely disagree about the terms - the other elements of this document are, broadly speaking, common to many other peace proposals of recent years, including the Clinton parameters, the Taba talks, the Arab League plan, the unofficial Geneva accord, the People’s Voice (Nusseibeh-Ayalon) Plan, the One Voice movement, the Road Map, the international protectorate or trusteeship proposal and myriad other peace initiatives.

This is not a coincidence, for they are the essential elements and have been for decades. Any proposal by any party from any side at any time that does not embrace these principles cannot solve the conflict and should not be taken seriously. In reality, the most likely alternative path – one that is getting perilously closer all the time – is, as alluded to earlier, perpetual conflict.

It is sometimes said that the conditions are not currently right for the final resolution of this conflict, as if they are somehow going to be more right in the future. To be sure, since the collapse of Oslo, Camp David and Taba, Israelis and Palestinians have run out of ideas - or the will - to settle their differences. However, this is not a self- contained dispute and other countries have a strong vested interest in avoiding its deadly global overspill. So there is a need and a justification for robust international intervention.

Any such initiative should include, as an initial vital plank, a long-term mutual ceasefire with the status quo frozen pending future negotiations on ‘final basket’ issues. This would provide some badly needed respite. Secondly, a confident demonstration on the part of Arab leaders of their dedication to their own peace plan could be timely and effective, for example by sending a high-level delegation to Israel and the Palestinian territories to appeal direct to both peoples, much as President Sadat controversially but successfully did towards the Israeli population in 1977. Thirdly, Jewish communities outside Israel could play a more independent, visionary role, to help Israel to escape from its own traps.

Most importantly, the Quartet and other powers should start taking their responsibilities a lot more seriously. What is required is a clear political horizon from them and a preparedness to step in decisively to ensure a final end is brought to this wretched conflict before it deteriorates to the point of no return. The international community, in all its parts, has abdicated its responsibility for far too long and we, for our part, have let them get away with it. It is, I believe, time to change this.

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Dr Tony Klug is a Middle East analyst and writer. He is currently Senior Policy Consultant at the Middle East Policy Initiative Forum and Vice Chair of the Arab-Jewish Forum.