BOOK REVIEW:  “We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work” (Jimmy Carter)

Mark Chmiel

Posted Apr 3, 2009      •Permalink      • Printer-Friendly Version
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BOOK REVIEW:  “We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work” (Jimmy Carter)

by Mark Chmiel

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), $27.00.


Now in his eighties, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter persistently continues his pursuit of peace in the Middle East. In the follow-up to his controversial book Palestine Peace Not Apartheid (2006), Carter covers familiar territory and comes up with a surprisingly optimistic perspective, revealed in the book’s title: We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work.

For his last book, Carter was denounced by some as an anti-Semite and the best friend of terrorists; nevertheless, he accomplished what he set out to do: namely, to provoke a lively debate on this central foreign policy question of how to foster peace in what he calls the Holy Land (i.e., Palestine and Israel).

I read Palestine Peace Not Apartheid with some appreciation and interest, because Carter used his immense cultural, symbolic, and political capital to draw attention to issues long downplayed or ignored in the U.S. mainstream. For example, in that book, he wrote, “Regardless of whether Palestinians had no formalized government, one headed by Yasir Arafat or Mahmoud Abbas, or one with Abbas as president and Hamas controlling the parliament and cabinet, Israel’s continued control and colonization of Palestinian land have been the primary obstacles to a comprehensive peace agreement in the Holy Land. In order to perpetuate the occupation, Israeli forces have deprived their unwilling subjects of basic human rights. No objective person could personally observe existing conditions in the West Bank and dispute these statements.” [208-209] I and several friends in Saint Louis have taken the opportunity to visit and work in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and can confirm Carter’s analysis.

Early in his book, Carter asks, “What is the existing deadlock in promoting peace?” [xvii] In the latter part of the book, he makes the following observations:


For the past thirty years, there has been no doubt in both private and public discussions, within the Holy Land and globally, the confiscation of land and building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank are recognized as one of the primary obstacles to peace. There has been a recent outpouring of condemnations by political leaders. [151-152]

The chance for successful peace negotiations would be greatly enhanced if the threat of terrorist acts could be effectively addressed. There is little doubt that a peace agreement in the Holy Land with a contiguous and viable state for the Palestinians would remove a major cause of terrorism throughout the region. [155]

Palestinians, Israelis, and other observers recognize that during the past sixteen years, U.S. political leaders have acquiesced in Israel’s massive settlement building in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Intended to establish permanent “facts on the ground,” the result has been to diminish (or eliminate) the prospect of a sovereign, contiguous, and viable Palestinian state with the West Bank linked to Gaza and its capital in Jerusalem. [166]


These three observations, then, go a long way to illuminating that issue of deadlock: Both the U.S. and Israel have been unwilling to agree to Israel’s withdrawal from Palestinian territory. Under Carter’s presidential successors Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the so-called “peace process” can more accurately be described as the “ghettoization process” of the Palestinians.

Carter achieved lasting fame for his role in bringing together Israel and Egypt in the Camp David Accords in 1979. During those negotiations, Carter noted that the Israeli leaders Menachem Begin and Moshe Dayan were not willing:


(1) to withdraw politically or militarily from any part of the West Bank; (2) to stop the construction of new settlements or the expansion of existing ones; (3) to withdraw Israeli settlers from Egypt’s Sinai or leave them under U.N. protection; (4) to acknowledge that U.N. resolution 242 applied to the West Bank-Gaza area; (5) to grant the Palestinians real authority or a voice in their own future; or (6) to discuss the issue of refugees. [35]


Many of the foregoing refusals characterize recent Israeli policy. Indeed, over the last thirty years, there has been a remarkable consistency in Israeli leadership. One expression used to describe their strategy is “movement without motion”—producing the illusion that diplomacy was focused on peace (while “facts on the ground” were being established that negate the possibility of a real peace settlement).

The “plan” referred to in the book’s subtitle refers to the long-standing two-state solution, which calls for Israel to return to its 1967 borders and terminating its settlements. (The two-state solution is based on the crucial U.N. resolutions, and embraced by the Arab League, and is the subject of several appendices in Carter’s book.) Yet, Carter plainly sees the continued, operative U.S. support for Israel’s “facts on the grounds,” as in these two passages: “As President Bush had not mentioned settlements in his Knesset speech, the Israelis not only ignored [Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice] but announced plans to build another thirteen hundred new homes in the West Bank and projected forty thousand more during the next decade.” [152] “On March 17 [Ehud Olmert] announced that Israel had the absolute right to continue expanding existing settlements and building new ones, especially around Jerusalem, despite objections from Washington or anywhere else.” [114]

Carter acknowledges the baleful significance of these settlements for the possibility of peace between Israel and Palestine. Further, he cites Palestinians and Israelis who believe that the settlements have rendered impossible a two-state solution, thus raising the issue of both peoples living together in one state. Carter notes: “The next stage within a single state would be a struggle before world opinion for equal political rights for millions of Palestinians voters similar to what took place in South Africa.” [162] Israel would then face the choice of losing its Jewishness as a state, or gaining full apartheidness as a state. Carter soberly concludes, “Perhaps the most important overarching decision for the Palestinians is whether to seek equal citizenship within a single nation instead of continuing their frustrated struggle for separate statehood. The Israelis will have to provide the ultimate response.” [170]

It is with that last sentence that I have to disagree. What is jarring in Carter’s book is his view, not of Israel or Palestine, but the United States. Consider these excerpts:


The United States will find all parties to the conflict—and leaders of other nations—eager to support strong, fair, and persistent leadership from Washington. [xx]

Yet for the past fifty years the United States has been widely recognized as the essential interlocutor that can provide guidance, encouragement, and support to those who want to find common ground. Unfortunately, most leaders in Washington have not been effective in helping parties find peace, while making it harder for other potential mediators in Europe, the Near East, and the United Nations to intercede. [xv]

I know from personal experience that the influence of our government is limited, but there is no prospect for regional harmony and stability unless the United States plays a leadership role … [179]


The historical record demonstrates that the U.S. government has overwhelmingly backed one side (Israel) with abundant military aid, steadfast diplomatic support in the U.N. and ardent Congressional backing as well, hardly a fair and balanced approach to the conflict. Accordingly, Washington has been relentlessly effective in enabling Israel to pursue its goals, not of peace and normalization, but of conquest of the choicest parts of Palestinian territory and of the elimination of any meaningful sense of Palestinian sovereignty. But even as Carter admits that U.S. influence is limited, surely, he must also realize the enormous agency the U.S. has long exerted in the region, agency that has been detrimental to the cause he champions. The U.S. has overwhelming power and has used that power as it sees fit, in this case, to empower Israel through dollars, votes, and deals. Regardless of official pronouncements, the U.S. government has been a full, bipartisan, and devoted partner to the demise of the two-state solution.

After the cover the United States provided Israel in its assault on Gaza in December and January, our claim to be interested in peace for Israel and Palestine is simply incredible to increasing numbers of people around the world. The U.S. has wanted it both ways: To be Israel’s staunch ally and to be seen in the international community as an honest and judicious broker. This is impossible. Either the Obama administration continues to unconditionally back Israel or else it must substantively change course and pursue an even-handed, balanced peace process.

For, as Palestinian Salam Fayyad put it simply to Carter, “Unless America stops the Israelis from expanding settlements there can be no peace. Not one more brick!” [124]

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