A Legal Theory of International Terrorism

Liaquat Ali Khan

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A Legal Theory of International Terrorism


Liaquat Ali Khan*

International terrorism is a political disorder that has grown to the detriment of the international legal system. A political disorder is like “a wasting disease,” said Niccolo Machiavelli, “to start with it is easy to cure but difficult to diagnose; after a time, unless it has been diagnosed and treated at the outset, it becomes easy to diagnose but difficult to cure.“1 To that remarkable insight, this must be added: A political disorder is further aggravated when quick-fix remedies are dispensed in frustration upon erroneous diagnosis. Such is the story of international terrorism. First, the international community has failed to diagnose correctly and to prescribe a proper treatment for international terrorism. Second, problems of terrorism are further complicated when frustrated individual states take unilateral action and administer questionable treatment to suppress the disorder.

This article suggests a new diagnostic approach to unravel the complexity of international terrorism. It treats terrorism as a political disorder at the core of which lies an aggrieved group. For example, Afghan refugees in South Asia, Palestinians in the Middle East, and the so-called “contra” rebels in Central America are aggrieved groups. Although the article does not suggest that the political demands of all aggrieved groups are necessarily legitimate, the members of all aggreived groups do share the perception that they have been wronged and that their grievances have been ignored.

Even though terrorist activity sprouts from the existence of an aggrieved group, the terrorist phenomenon may involve several members of the international community. These members may be divided into two categories: supportive states and suppressive states.2 Supportive states stand behind the aggrieved group and support its politlcal objectives, while suppressive states confront the group and oppose its objectives.3 This cleavage between members of the international community compounds the problem and makes it difficult to find a peaceful solution to a given political disorder.4 When suppressive states slight the demands or aggravate the sufferings of an aggrieved group, the political disorder further deteriorates. Vengeful members of the aggrieved group, with the help of supportive states, increasingly resort to terrorist activity in order to inflict injury upon the suppressive states, as well as to internationalize their political grievances.5

Although some members of all aggrieved groups commit terrorist acts, not all members of these groups are terrorists. In fact, only a small minority of an aggrieved group may undertake terrorist activity. This distinction is important because there is a general tendency on the part of some suppressive states to condemn the entire aggrieved group as terrorists. Some supporting states, on the other hand, also do not make this distinction and play applaud the entire group as “freedom fighters.”

This conflicting characterization of violence is a distinctive feature of contemporary international politics. Different states use different terminologies to describe the same acts and actors of violence.6 In fact, the same state may use conflicting terminologies to distinguish between similar acts of violence of different aggrieved groups, describing one as legitimate armed struggle but the other its terrorist activity. The Soviet Union, for example, views Palestinian violence as legitimate armed struggle, but Afghan resistance as terrorism.7 The United State, the other hand, describes Afghan violence as legitimate armed struggle, but condemns Palestinian resistance as terrorism.8 Thus, if a state supports the political objectives of an aggrieved group, it uses positive labels to describe its radical members and their acts of violence. But if a state views disfavorably the political demands of an aggrieved group, it employs negative labels to condemn both the actors and the acts of violence.

Such differing characterization of acts of violence is a kind of psychological warfare between supportive and suppressive states. In order to discredit an aggrieved group both in the eyes of its own public and the international community, a suppressive state uses words like “terrorism” and “terrorists” that have negative emotional dimensions. On the other hand, because supportive states want to present the same aggrieved group positively, they use terms such as “freedom fighters” or “legitimate armed struggle” to induce favorable psychological effects.9 By using psychologically negative words, suppressive states hope to show that these acts of violence are purely criminal acts without any redeeming value. By using positive terminologies, supportive states attempt to show that the aggrieved group is engaged in a heroic struggle against an evil regime. Labels become weapons to influence, and even to manipulate, domestic and international public opinion. If a state has successfully labelled a phenomenon according to its national viewpoint, it has won a major battle in an ongoing war.10 But while these ideological labels might make sense from national perspectives, they are, in fact, part of the problem. When states reserve to themselves the authority to determine what is and what is not terrorism and characterize the same acts differently, the definition of terrorism itself becomes disputed.11

The theory of terrorism as a political disorder is neutral in that it rejects national perspectives. It focuses on the disorder that causes terrorism, but does not distinguish between terrorists and freedom fighters. From this basis, the article argues that an international political disorder that causes terrorism is a “dispute” within the meaning of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which mandates that the parties to any dispute shall, first of all, seek a solution by peaceful means including negotiation.12 Unless the parties to a dispute - the aggrieved group, the suppressive states, and the supportive states - are willing to resolve the political disorder through a negotiated settlement, the problems of terrorism will remain. Finally, the article explores the inefficacy of existing remedies to counter terrorism, and argues that the current trend of non-negotiation between the parties not only undermines Article 33 of the Charter but intensifies the problems of international terrorism.

I. PARTIES TO THE POLITICAL DISORDER
A. Aggrieved Groups

Terrorism sprouts from the existence of aggrieved groups. These aggrieved groups share two essential characteristics: they have specific political objectives, and they believe that violence is an inevitable means to achieve their political ends. The political dimension of terrorist violence is the key factor that distinguishes it from other crimes.13 It is hard to dispute that the nature and effect of terrorist actions are similar to violent crimes and that good moral reasons therefore exist to treat them alike.14 Yet, a politically aggrieved group should not be confused with a mere gang of criminals. Futhermore, even though the political objectives sought by an aggrieved group are not always legitimate, members of the group share the perception that their grievances have been ignored. This shared perception helps to define an aggrieved group.

Aggrieved groups responsible for international terrorism belong to diverse regions, religions, nationalities and ideologies.15 Likewise, their political objectives vary.16 Some are fighting against occupation, foreign domination, and racist regimes.17 Others use violence to extract political concessions from their home state.18 Still others resort to violence in order to modify social, economic, military or foreign policies of their home state and, at times, those of a foreign state.19 Thus, each group may present a unique political disorder.

B. Supportive and Suppresive States

Both supportive and suppressive states are necessary parties to the phenomenon of terrorism. Their respective roles, however, are distinct. First, supportive states embrace and espouse the political demands of an aggrieved group, whereas suppressive states reject them. In fact, the suppressive states may have caused the perceived political grievances. Second, supportive states provide moral, financial and military assistance to the aggrieved group, whereas suppressive states arrest and punish them. Thus, the terrorist phenomenon assumes the character of surrogate warfare20 between supportive and suppressive states where members of an aggrieved group sacrifice human lives, including their own.

In order to fully understand the complexity of the terrorist phenomenon, a further distinction must be made between principal supportive states and accessory supportive states. While all accessory supportive states show sympathy for at least some of the basic political demands of an aggrieved group, not all provide arms or other assistance to the group.21 Some may not even support all acts of violence committed by radical members of the group.22 Others may show only muted support for such acts of violence.23 Still others may outrightly condemn such violence.24 Despite these varied responses, accessory supportive states play an important role in providing a moral climate from which the radical members of an aggrieved group draw both the courage of their convictions and the inspiration to resort to violence.25

Principal supportive states, on the other hand, not only support the political demands of an aggrieved group, but provide a financial and military infrastructure to facilitate acts of violence.26 Some such states even allow an aggrieved group to use their territory for setting up camps where radical members are recruited, trained, and armed in order to carry out acts of violence.27 These states also provide legal protection to the perpetrators of violence both within and across their national boundaries.28

Although principal supportive states may have some sympathy for the political objectives of aggrieved groups, they are not always motivated by compassion. Nor do they always support such groups for advancing the cause of international law or morality. Often, their active support for a particular aggrieved group is grounded to their own national, ideological, or geopolitical interests.29 Indeed, some principal supportive states use aggrieved groups to conduct surrogate warfare to influence the politics of other countries30 and, at times, to establish or further entrench their regional or global influence.31

Suppressive states may also be divided into principal suppressive states and accessory suppressive states. Although all suppressive states may resist the political demands of an aggrieved group, principal suppressive states oppose them more openly and consistently. In characterizing principal and accessory suppressive states, the aggrieved group’s perception is critical.32 First, an aggrieved group may perceive that all unfriendly states are suppressive states. Second, it may regard its own home state as the main source of their grievances.33 Third, an aggrieved group may believe that a regional or a global power is the principal suppressive state.34

The division of the international community into supportive and suppressive states is more complex than it might seem. Because states take different positions regarding different aggrieved group, they may act both as supportive and suppressive states. The same state may provide financial and military assistance to one group and condemn the violence of another. Each state defends its conflicting responses to the violence of different groups from its own national perspective.35 This dual approach toward terrorism confounds the definition of terrorism and impairs the orderly functioning of the international system.

II. THE POLITICAL DISORDER
A political disorder is essentially a conflict in which an aggrieved group uses violence to achieve its political objectives. Further, such a disorder involves at least one principal suppressive state that ignores or rejects the political demands of the group. When an aggrieved group perceives that the commission of violence is inevitable or necessary for achieving its political objectives, it attacks the nationals and property of that principal suppressive state. The group may also attack the nationals and property of an accessory suppressive state that either supports the principal suppressive state or opposes the political demands of the aggrieved group. Even though aggrieved groups do not always carefully select their targets, their violence is often directed against the states that the group believes are frustrating its political goals.

It is important to distinguish a domestic political disorder from an international political disorder. Four characteristics are essential to a domestic political disorder. First, the aggrieved group’s political grievances are addressed to its home state.36 Second, the aggrieved group, for the most part, remains within the home state.37 Third, it directs its terrorist activity against domestic targets.38 Fourth, it does not receive, directly or indirectly, any financial or military assistance from a foreign state.39 A political disorder with these four characteristics will generally lie within the domestic jurisdiction of the home state. To abate domestic terrorism, the home state may either accept the political demands of the aggrieved group or may suppress the group through rigorous enforcement of law and order.

An international political disorder, on the other hand, occurs when one of four other conditions exist. First, the aggrieved groups political grievances involve a foreign state.40 Second, the group seeks or has been forced to seek asylum in a foreign state.41 Third, the group directs its violence against the nationals or property of a foreign state.42 Fourth, the group receives, directly or indirectly, financial or military support from a foreign state.43 If any one of these four elements is present, the group activity may constitute international terrorism. Stated differently, when one or more foreign states are involved directly or indirectly in a given conflict, such a disorder acquires an international dimension. Although it is difficult to classify multifaceted international political disorders responsible for terrorism into mutually exclusive categories, two distinct sources of international terrorism are ideological disorders and refugee disorders.

A. Ideological Disorders

Ideological disorders occur when an aggrieved group rises violence in order to register its ideological disapproval of a perceived menace such as capitalism, communism, nuclear weapons, or United States or Soviet “imperialism.” If an ideological group remains within its home state and directs its terrorist activity against domestic targets, such activity may constitute a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the home state.44 However, terrorist actions committed by an ideological group within its own home state do not always constitute a purely domestic matter that does not affect the international legal order. Even indigenous terrorist groups may cause international anguish when, in pursuit of their political objectives, they attack foreign targets within their home state.45 Thus, ideological terrorism may have international ramifications when aggrieved groups attack foreign targets. It becomes unmanageable when the home state lacks sufficient law-enforcement resources to curb such conduct.

Almost all states are vulnerable to revolutionary violence. This form of violence is rampant in developing countries, particularly those that fail to achieve a national consensus as to which fundamental values constitute a viable political system. When a population is morally confused and politically fragmented, revolutionary groups may exploit the resulting chaos and use force to advance their respective ideologies.46 Further, when the authority of a government is not rooted in the will of the people, domestic ideological groups find it expedient to label their violence as a struggle to restore democracy.47 These ideological disorders become more complex when indigenous revolutionary groups receive financial and military support from foreign states.

Regional and global powers often give such support to undermine existing governments. They encourage local terrorism as part of a longterm campaign to promote their important strategic interests, to extend regional or global influence, and to establish sympathetic regimes in developing countries.48 Moreover, they support domestic revolutionaries conducting terrorism because warfare by surrogates is both effective and economical, especially when the use of their own conventional armed forces is deemed inappropriate or too risky.49

The international legal system has failed to curb ideological terrorism because states continue to take morally inconsistent positions regarding such terrorism. They foment revolutionary terrorism when it suits their strategic ends,50 but resent it when it is directed against them.51 This selective condemnation of ideological terrorism is likely to remain a fruitless enterprise until states in general, and regional and global powers in particular, conform their behavior to universal principles of international law and take seriously the political independence and territorial integrity of every other state.52

The distinction between ideological groups and other aggrieved groups is particularly crucial in view of the differing responses they may receive from the international community. Although the international community often recognizes the plight of aggrieved groups under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination, and upholds the legitimacy of their struggle,53 no such recognition is generally accorded to groups promoting a specific economic ideology. Of course, the international community recognizes that all peoples, in exercising their collective right of self-determination, may freely choose their own domestic institutions.54 Except for a few states, however, the international community does not show much sympathy or support for small groups of dissidents that use violence to impose on their home state their own brand of socio-political or economic ideology. World opinion generally remains unsupportive even when the dissidents leave their home state and conduct their terrorist operations from a foreign country.55

B. Refugee Disorders

Serious international disorders occur when states fail to resolve the grievances of a refugee group. Some aggrieved groups, owing to external aggression, occupation or foreign domination, have either fled or have been compelled to leave their home state; others have become stateless.56 These refugee groups resort to terrorist activity in order to assert their right to have a home state or return to their home state.57

Refugee groups resorting to violence are thus distinguishable from aggrieved groups that remain within their home state. The terrorist activity perpetrated by refugee groups poses radically different and far more serious international problems, simply because their activity inevitably brings asylum states into the conflict. If the home state of a refugee group is under foreign occupation, refugee terrorism persists because those elements that have left or have been forced to leave their home state show a determined resolve to use violence in establishing their right to return. When a refugee group has no home state to which it may return, its violence becomes totally unscrupulous.58

Supportive world opinion regarding the political demands of refugee groups plays a key role in both encouraging and perpetuating acts of violence. It is evident from United Nations General Assembly resolutions that even when the international community condemns terrorism, it simultaneously upholds the legitimacy of the struggle against occupation and foreign domination, as well as reaffirming the right of self-determination.59 When an aggrieved group perceives to have succeeded in obtaining moral support from the international community, its sense of indignation and inequity is reinforced. It then becomes much more militant, using violence vigorously and persistently.60

The adverse circumstances under which refugee groups are forced to live is an important factor in understanding the refugee disorder. When a refugee group is large and its living conditions are miserable, such an environment may create a climate of frustration and anxiety. This frustration is further aggravated when a refugee group perceives that it has beconlc stateless. Under such circumstances, members of a refugee group susceptible to violence may release their frustration by the commission of terrorist acts.61 In this regard, one must be careful in labelling the entire refugee group as terrorists.62 Yet some suppressive states, in order to undermine the political demands of a refugee group and to divert public attention from the underlying causes of violence, may condemn the group as bandits or terrorists.63

Refugee disorders stagnate when states are divided in their support of and opposition to the political demands of refugee groups. The dynamics of refugee-group terrorism emerge from a triangular relationship among the refugee group, supportive states, and suppressive states. One side of this triangle is made up of supportive states that provide moral, financial and military support to the refugee group. The second side is composed of suppressive states that not only condemn the methodology of violence, but may question, ignore, or flatly reject the political objectives of the refugee group. The triangle is completed when the refugee group receives assistance from the supportive states and directs its violence against the suppressive states.

When a refugee disorder lingers, the triangular relationship between the refugee group and supportive and suppressive states loses its moral constraints. Principal supportive states use the aggrieved group as expendable pawns to advance their own geopolitical interests. Principal suppressive states treat the entire group as terrorists and attack refugee camps, killing not only terrorists but innocent men, women, and children.64 To dramatize its misery, frustration and revenge, the refugee group attacks symbols of the suppressive states including soldiers,65 diplomats66 and businessmen.67 Even innocent lives are sacrificed.68

Refugee disorders remain uncured because supportive and suppressive states fail to resolve the problem through peaceful means. This stalemate deepens when influential members of the international community are equally divided. Often, the legal and moral issues raised by a refugee problem are complex and seem insoluble.69 These issues are further complicated when international processes for finding a solution are pursued half-heartedly or not initiated at all.

III. TRADITIONAL RESPONSES T0 TERRORISM
Three kinds of remedies to the problems of terrorism are frequently suggested by government officials and scholars. First, some contend that all terrorists must be treated its criminals and that stiff punishments must be prescribed for all terrorist acts.70 Second, some argue for more extradition treaties and urge that political-offense exceptions71 in such treaties should either be narrowed or totally eliminated.72 Third, still others contend that states that sponsor terrorism should be punished.73 These strict laws are often proposed for suppressing the activities of only select aggrieved groups. Because almost all states and some scholars make the distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters,74 such remedies are generally employed to deter only disfavored aggrieved groups. A suppressive state, for example, may attempt to extradite and punish members of an aggrieved group that it suppresses, but at the same time may refuse to extradite and punish members of a group that it supports.75 These three traditional responses to the problems of terrorism, although useful in limited circumstances, are inadequate.

Obviously, if more extradition treaties were signed and if political-offense exceptions were eliminated, the system could become more effective in dealing with terrorisis.76 Even so, the critical question remains which states would sign such treaties. States that suppress the same aggrieved groups have often entered into extradition treaties among themselves.77 These treaties are useful only to the extent that suppressive states will be able to extradite terrorists among themselves.78 Extradition treaties, however, are ineffective to check refugee terrorism because refugee terrorists do not live in suppressive states. Instead, they live in and operate from states that support them. Principal supportive states not only provide refugee terrorists with funds and weapons, but they also give them legal protection both within and across their national boundaries.79 It is unlikely that such a supportive state will enter into an extradition treaty with a suppressive state.80 Moreover, if an extradition treaty already exists, the supportive state probably would not agree to eliminate the political-offense exception and extradite those whom it supports.81 This remedy, therefore, is unavailable where it is most needed.

Similarly, those who argue that all terrorists must be treated as criminals and given severe punishments miss the point.82 Of course, suppressive states may impose severe sanctions on terrorists, but again, most refugee terrorists, after committing their terrorist actions, return to safe havens in supportive states where they are treated as heroes, not as criminals.83 Furthermore, when a suppressive state arrests refugee terrorists, others are not necessarily deterred. In fact, others commit more acts of terrorism to free the captives.84 Unfortunately, with respect to the unique phenomenon of refugee terrorism, when force is met with force, the violence is further compounded.85 Moreover, refugee groups in general, and stateless groups in particular, are composed of desperate people who do not seem to be easily deterred from violence.86 Several theories have been advanced to explain the psychology of terrorists: that the subculture in which terrorists live or have been forced to live breeds frustration and violence;87 that terrorists are only doing what they must do;88 that they are fanatics;89 that they have no respect for authority;90 or that they suffer from mental diseases.91 These explanations, although useful for understanding the minds of terrorists, provide no evidence that refugee terrorists would be deterred by sanctions. Nor do they suggest that fear of punishment would modify their violent behavior.

Even if severe punishments were successful in diminishing purely domestic violence, and even helped to suppress revolutionary groups, they do not resolve the root causes of refugee terrorism. In fact, punishment can radicalize still more members of an aggrieved group, resulting in a suppressive state labelling the entire group as terrorists. Such labelling not only generates sentiments of hatred, but indeed dehumanizes the entire group.92

The third remedy-punishing states that sponsor terrorism-seems equally problematic. First, even a powerful nation would likely find it difficult to punish all supportive states. Of course, supportive states can be punished selectively, but selective punishment poses serious international problems. Selective punishment is arbitrary in that it allows each suppressive state to determine for itself which supportive state it will punish. It is also dangerous because it destabilizes the international legal order.93 More important, selective punishment can be undermined if the international community regards such measures as acts of aggressions.94 Finally, such punitive measures can lose their moral legitimacy if the punishing state itself is supporting other aggrieved groups.

IV. AN APPROACH TO NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND TERRORISM
Given the inefficacy of existing remedies, states involved in or affected by terrorism should seek solutions by direct or indirect negotiation. Because terrorism has endangered the maintenance of international peace and security, both suppressive and supportive states are under a legal obligation to settle the disorder, first of all, by pacific means.95 Article 33 of the United Nations Charter requires parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security, to seek a solution, among other peaceful means, by negotiation, mediation, and conciliation.96 A negotiated settlement among the supportive and suppresive states and the aggrieved group not only facilitates understanding between opposing states, but could alleviate some of the root causes of terrorism.97

The process of negotiation itself will be useful for several reasons. First, it will establish channels of communication between the parties. Second, the principal supportive states may influence the refugee group to refrain from violence while the process is under way. Third, a refugee group in the hope of achieving at least some of their political objectives may be inclined to exercise self-restraint. Fourth, the suppressive states, by showing their willingness to negotiate, may establish their credibility among the international community, including some supportive states. Hence, the process of negotiation itself may reduce at least to some degree the intensity of refugee terrorism.

Seeking a negotiated solution may modify the seemingly irreconcilable positions of the parties. When the principal supportive and principal suppressive states are serious about finding a negotiated solution, the negotiation process by its nature will change their positions.98 Even radical members will have to tone down their rhetoric and violence. If they continue their violence during the process of negotiation, the principal supportive states might cut off financial and military support, and might even use coercive force against them.

The process of negotiation can begin only if the parties recognize the conflict and show mutual respect for each other’s existence. Often, parties decline to negotiate believing that negotiation in itself will legitimize and give respectability to political demands of the other party.99 This belief is an impediment to the negotiation process because it refuses to recognize the existence of a dispute between the parties, and is contrary to the spirit of international law, which obligates states to resolve their conflicts through peaceful means.100

Fruitful negotiation will require that all necessary parties be joined in the process.101 Obviously, the aggrieved group and the principal supportive and suppressive states are indispensable. To achieve a more stable negotiated solution, accessory supportive and suppressive states may be included, especially when such states have regional influence and will be later helpful in implementing the solution.102 States that could play an effective role in laying the groundwork for negotiation and its successful conclusion would be crucial to the process.

To further facilitate the process of negotiation, the influential members of the international community, including the United States, can play an important role by encouraging, assisting and even pressuring the parties to find a negotiated solution. Although such pressure does not affect the positions of the parties, it keeps intact the process of negotiation.103

A negotiated settlement may be the most appropriate method to resolve refugee disorders.104 As suggested earlier, a refugee disorder is not only a conflict between a refugee group and principal suppressive states, it also constitutes a dispute between principal supportive and principal suppressive states.105 Almost every refugee disorder involves one or more principal supportive states that provide asylum to the group. Other principal supportive states may provide financial and military support to equip the group for an armed struggle.106 Thus, a refugee disorder results in a struggle between the refugee group and principal suppressive states on the one hand, and a conflict between principal supportive and principal suppressive states on the other.107

Given the complexity of refugee disorders, the division of the international community into ideological blocks, and the inclination of states to pursue their selfish interests, a negotiated solution to terrorism may appear to be an unrealistic remedy, if not a fool’s dream. Nevertheless, even if there are reasons to be skeptical, the international community must be forced to face up to its commitment to “bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace"108 - a cardinal principle embodied in the United Nations Charter.

Although a negotiated settlement appears to be the most effective course to deal with refugee terrorism, it is not suggested that all disorders causing terrorism can or should be resolved through negotiation. For instance, it may be appropriate for each state to determine whether it will curb domestic terrorism by domestic political processes or by stiff law-enforcement measures. Likewise, it may or may not be prudent to negotiate with an ideological cell.109

Ideological terrorism supported by foreign states will not diminish unless supportive states conform their behavior to the stated principles of international law that impose upon every state a duty to refrain from encouraging, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state.110 When ideological groups are unable to receive support from foreign countries, their capacity to commit violence will be substantially reduced. Consequently, it may be easier for the home state to curb terrorism against domestic and foreign targets.111 Without foreign support, ideological groups might also turn to domestic political processes to air their grievances. The assumption of most ideological groups that regional and global powers will continue supporting them is largely illusory.

CONCLUSION
A legal theory of international political disorders focuses on the triangular relationship among an aggrieved group, supportive states and suppressive states. Supportive states promote political objectives of aggrieved groups, whereas suppressive states reject them. When a group’s demands are ignored, it directs its violence against the nationals and property of suppressive states. Because supportive and suppressive states fail to resolve the political disorder, the aggrieved group intensifies its terrorist activity. Ideological disorders, as distinguished from refugee disorders, are caused when revolutionary groups with the assistance of supportive states use violence to register their disapproval of a perceived ideological menace. These disorders will continue to exist unless states take seriously the principles of international law and refrain from supporting such revolutionary factions. Refugee disorders, on the other hand, occur when an aggrieved group becomes stateless or when the home state of that group fails to resolve its grievances. Such disorders are internationalized when foreign states are directly involved in support of and in opposition to a refugee group’s grievances. Given the complexity of refugee disorders, the supportive and suppressive states involved should seek negotiated solutions under established international legal principles.


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* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University. M.A., L.L.B., Punjab university; L.L.M., J.S.D., New York University. The author wishes to thank Gregg Bachmann for his able research assistance and Professors Jim Wadley and Bill Rich for their incisive comiments.

Originally published in the Connecticut Law Review (1987).  All of the notes for this article may be found at http://www.washburnlaw.edu/faculty/khan-a-fulltext/1987-19connlr945.php

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